La demanderesse, une société indienne, conclut un contrat de fourniture avec une entreprise tanzanienne, la seconde défenderesse. Cette dernière, en tant qu'acheteur, devait régler le prix d'achat en quatorze versements semestriels, majorés d'intérêts. Le paiement du prix d'achat et des intérêts était garanti par une banque tanzanienne, la première défenderesse. La seconde défenderesse se trouvant en défaut de paiement, la demanderesse appela la garantie. Celle-ci estimait que la garantie étant indépendante du contrat de fourniture, la banque était tenue d'honorer la garantie et ne pouvait y échapper au prétexte d'erreurs ou de négligence dans l'exécution du contrat de fourniture. Elle considérait par ailleurs que toutes les conditions étaient réunies pour que l'appel de la garantie soit valable et qu'il n'était pas nécessaire de réexaminer les faits relatifs au contrat de fourniture conclu entre elle-même et la seconde défenderesse. La banque estimait en revanche que les conditions de paiement stipulées dans la garantie n'avaient pas été remplies et qu'elle n'était nullement redevable aux termes de celle-ci.

Pour trancher cette affaire, le tribunal se penche d'abord sur la question des règles de droit matériel applicables en l'espèce. Pour ce qui concerne la garantie, il constate qu'aucune des deux parties n'avait invoqué le droit tanzanien, mais que la demanderesse comme la banque s'appuyaient principalement sur les termes exprès de la garantie, complétés de documents relatifs à leur interprétation en droit français, anglais, indien et autre. Le tribunal examine ensuite la nature de la garantie et cherche à déterminer si la demanderesse était en droit de l'appeler.

'The Second Issue: Classification of Guarantee

Under this issue, we consider whether the Bank's obligation to pay [Claimant] under the Guarantee is triggered upon the simple written demand for payment by [Claimant], as [Claimant] contends. In other words, is the document: (1) an independent guarantee payable on mere demand to the beneficiary, without any regard to the merits of any dispute between [Claimant] and [Second Respondent] under the Supply Contract? Or (2) is it a guarantee where the Bank is a primary obligor with [Second Respondent] under the Supply Contract? Or (3) is it only a simple guarantee of [Second Respondent]'s due performance of the Supply Contract, imposing a secondary liability on the Bank? We consider below each possibility in turn.

From the legal materials supplied by [Claimant] and the Bank, we recognise the existence and widespread use of a form of bank guarantee in the field of international trade whereby the banker undertakes to the beneficiary an unconditional obligation to pay an ascertainable sum on the beneficiary's mere written demand, without any further proof of entitlement to such payment by the beneficiary. Under such a "demand guarantee", it is no defence to the bank that no sum is actually owed to the beneficiary under the separate commercial contract between the beneficiary and the banker's customer. Short of proof of fraud by the beneficiary, the banker must pay the beneficiary; and in practice it will be for the bank's customer separately to recover that payment from the beneficiary under the commercial contract, if at all. (Insofar as this form of instrument was not already established in the field of international trade, the position is in the process of clarification with the ICC's Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees published in April 1992.)

In this case, the third sentence of Clause 2 of the Guarantee contains the important phrase for a "demand guarantee", as [Claimant] contends: i.e. "simple first written demand":

"2. [The Bank], hereby unconditionally and irrevocably guarantee to you, not merely as surety but as primary obligor the due and punctual payments to [[Claimant]] by [[Second Respondent]] of each and every one of the said instalments ..." [second sentence]. In the event of any default on the part of [[Second Respondent]] in the payment of any one or more of the said instalment [the Bank] undertake to pay you on [[Claimant]'s] simple first written demand of not less than 21 days ... all the sums which the buyer fails to pay on due dates." [third sentence]

We accept that the presence of an arbitration clause in the Guarantee (Clause 7) does not, per se, mean that it cannot be a "demand guarantee", as is argued by the Bank. On the other hand, the phrase "unconditionally and irrevocably" in Clause 2 does not assist [Claimant]: the former word means only that the beneficiary need not first exhaust its remedies against the primary debtor; and the latter indicates that the instrument is not a unilateral promise revocable by the Bank but a binding bilateral contract from its issue by the Bank and acceptance by [Claimant]. Further, whereas both parties made different submissions on Clause 9 (whereby the Bank is not released under the Guarantee by any forbearance by [Claimant] under the Supply Contract), this clause points unequivocally in neither direction: it is unnecessary for a "demand guarantee" because it is a wholly independent instrument from the commercial contract; and it is also unnecessary for a guarantee where the bank is a "primary obligor" because forbearance to one obligor cannot ipso facto operate as forbearance to the other (in contrast to a simple guarantee). We consider that by itself this clause can provide little guidance to the appropriate classification of the Guarantee.

The phrase "simple first written demand" invoked by [Claimant] is not decisive. Like other words and phrases on which each party relies for their respective submissions on this point, we consider that it has to be interpreted in the context of the Guarantee read as a whole-which points in the other direction. For a "demand guarantee", there would be no need to provide for the listing of due dates and amounts under Clause 2 (last sentence); and in particular it would be inappropriate expressly to qualify a demand with an event of default by [Second Respondent] and sums due from [Second Respondent], as follows:

"In the event of any default on the part of the Buyer in the payment of any one or more of the said instalments . . . all the sums which [[Second Respondent]] fails to pay on due dates . . ." (Clause 2, second sentence - our emphasis).

Of course the Guarantee would also be a shorter and more simple contractual document. Granted that the Guarantee is poorly drafted and that it should not be or should never become a standard banking form (as was intimated at the oral hearing), we nonetheless consider that [Claimant]'s mere demand cannot trigger a payment obligation by the Bank under the terms of the Guarantee, interpreted a whole.

We consider the Guarantee to be an instrument whereby the Bank is a "primary obligor" for the due and punctual payments by [Second Respondent] to [Claimant]. These are the crucial unambiguous words contained in the Guarantee (see Clause 2, line 2). We decide that the phrase imposes on the Bank a primary obligation co-extensive with the obligation of [Second Respondent] under the Supply Contract. Accordingly, it is possible to give meaning to Clauses 2 and 4 whereby the liability of the Bank is conditional upon and pro tanto discharged with the liability of [Second Respondent]. This means that [Claimant] cannot recover a sum from the Bank unless it has a valid claim under the Supply Contract for any one or more of the instalments or interest therein described.

It follows that we dismiss the third possibility listed above. Given the express words "primary obligor" in Clause 2, we decide that the Bank does not assume only a secondary liability under the Guarantee; and accordingly the Guarantee cannot merely guarantee [Second Respondent]'s due performance of its obligations under the Supply Contract.